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ORIGINAL RESEARCH
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Introduction:

In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, an interprofessional, interdisciplinary team at
Maine Medical Center used Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA) and in situ simulation
to rapidly identify and mitigate latent safety threats (LST) in patient transport protocols.

Methods:

Following HFMEA steps, stakeholders representing a variety of disciplines assembled to address
transport of patients with COVID-19. A process map was created to describe the process. With hazard
analysis using table-top simulation followed by in situ simulation, we identified, categorized, and scored
LSTs. Mitigation strategies were identified during structured debriefing.

Results:

Fourteen LSTs were identified in the categories of infection prevention (4), care coordination (2),
equipment (2), facilities (2), teams (2), clinical skills (1), and diagnosis and treatment (1). Of these, 10
had “critical” hazard scores. Mitigation solutions were tested with in situ simulation. Results were shared
with leadership and led to changes in hospital-wide protocols.

Discussion:

The COVID-19 pandemic presented an urgent need to create or adapt protocols to keep patients and
staff safe. Our team combined simulation with HFMEA methodology to improve the safety of protocols
for transporting patients with COVID-19. Simulation enabled recreation of real-world experience that
exposed LSTs more thoroughly than mental walkthroughs alone. Use of HFMEA methodology supported
quantifying identified LSTs and proposing mitigation strategies, while in situ simulation facilitated testing
many proposed strategies.

Conclusions:

HFMEA used with in situ simulation provides an effective method to efficiently and thoroughly probe a
process for failure modes, providing practical mitigation strategies.

Keywords:

simulation, COVID-19, patient transport, latent safety threats, healthcare failure mode and effect
analysis

H

ealthcare simulation increasingly plays a role
in patient safety through systems integration.
When used for this purpose, the objective
is to improve processes by enhancing safety and
efficiency. In this capacity, simulation is a highly
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effective tool for identifying “latent” safety threats
(LST) (those that have not yet caused harm) and
testing solutions for remediation.1
Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(HFMEA) is a tool developed by the National Center
for Patient Safety at the Department of Veterans
Affairs that provides a proactive system to identify
LSTs. This system counterbalances root cause
analysis, a tool that analyzes harmful events after
they occur.2 HFMEA helps to identify “failure modes”
1
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(FMs; the ways in which a process can fail), quantify
the severity of those FMs, prioritize resources
to address FMs by calculating a hazard score,
and task stakeholder-participants with identifying
mitigation solutions. Traditionally, HFMEA is a
theoretical exercise in which stakeholders discuss
each step of a process and brainstorm potential
ways the process can fail.

outbreaks.13 Staff anxiety was generally high as
reports of widespread infection of healthcare
workers circulated.14,15

Simulation enhances HFMEA by enabling realistic
enactment of each step of a process, providing
deeper insight than theoretical consideration
alone.3 In situ simulation (bringing simulation to the
clinical care environment) goes further, allowing
stakeholders to explore and share perspectives
that may only be apparent in the environmental
context in which they normally provide care. LSTs
and effective mitigation strategies are often contextspecific, and in situ simulation is ideally suited to
reveal these context-specific LSTs and strategies.

METHODS

The COVID-19 pandemic presented an urgent
need to rapidly adapt healthcare systems with new
processes and standards in response to novel
stresses. The healthcare simulation community
quickly embraced the challenge by sharing
resources to help colleagues adapt and disseminate
protocols for endotracheal intubation, code team
responses, telemedicine skills, and appropriate use
of personal protective equipment (PPE).4,5,6 Maine
Medical Center engaged the simulation team for
this purpose.7,8,9
In March 2020, our hospital admitted a surgical
patient with respiratory symptoms who was later
diagnosed with COVID-19. A team of stakeholders,
including simulation staff, assembled the night before
the procedure to prepare and rehearse the plan.
The patient underwent the operation uneventfully,
after which the team reassembled to debrief. They
identified safety concerns related to the process
of transporting patients with COVID-19, as this
process could lead to widespread environmental
and personnel contamination.
Multiple contextual factors influenced thoughts
around best practices for transporting patients with
COVID-19. In March 2020, information and best
practices were rapidly evolving. Notably, ongoing
debate about the risk of contact versus airborne
transmission existed.10,11,12 PPE supply was
tenuous due to a surge in worldwide demand and
breakdown of the supply chain due to workforce
https://knowledgeconnection.mainehealth.org/jmmc/vol3/iss2/8
DOI: 10.46804/2641-2225.1092

The objective of our study was to test and propose
improvements to operating room (OR) transport
protocols for patients with or suspected to have
COVID-19 to minimize risks of infection.

The team assembled for one afternoon on April 7,
2020 to complete the bulk of an in situ simulation
exercise guided by HFMEA. This exercise was
co-facilitated by a physician (JK) representing
anesthesia and a nurse lead (MC) representing
simulation. Both facilitators are experienced
simulation educators, and MC is also experienced in
simulation-enhanced HFMEA processes. Planning
and follow-up occurred in a 1- to 2-day period
before and after the activity. Reporting to hospital
leadership occurred the following week.
The HFMEA proceeded according to the steps
outlined below and in Figure 1.
1. Define the topic and process
Transport of a non-intubated patient with or
suspected to have COVID-19 to and from the OR
was the process of focus.
2. Assemble the team
Leaders from anesthesia, simulation, and OR
services identified additional stakeholders needed
to fully explore the process. Table 1 summarizes
the disciplines and departments that were invited to
participate in the exercise.
3. Graphically describe the process
The team began by creating a process map (Figure
2) to describe the transport process from beginning
to end.
4. Conduct a hazard analysis
Using this process map, we began our hazard
analysis with a table-top simulation. In this step, we
theoretically explored each step of the process, with
involved stakeholders sharing their perspective.
This interprofessional team collaboratively identified
potential FMs and, where possible, explored the
degree of severity (potential of harm to patient or
staff) and probability (likelihood of occurring), as
well as mitigation strategies (Figure 3).
2
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Figure 1. Overview of Steps in a Healthcare Failure Modes and Effects Analysis19
*Figure adopted from Reference 19-Nielsen DS, Dieckmann P, Mohr M, Mitchell AU, Ostergaard D.
Augmenting health care failure modes and effects analysis with simulation. Simul Healthc, 2014;9(1):4855

Figure 2. HFMEA Process Map for OR Transport of COVID-19 Positive Patient
The process map provided the shared mental model of patient transport the stakeholders used to guide
their discussion and probe for failure modes. During its development, the assembled stakeholders walked
through each step of the transport process in granular detail, with every stakeholder involved in a step
providing their perspective of how that step works in practice.

Published by MaineHealth Knowledge Connection, 2021
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DEFINITIONS – PROBABILITY (P)
Frequent (4)

Occasional (3)

Uncommon (2)

Remote (1)

Likely to occur

Probably will occur

Possible to occur

Unlikely to occur

immediately or within
a short period

may happen several
times in 1 to 2 years

may happen sometime
in 2 to 5 years

may happen sometime
in 5 to 30 years

DEFINITIONS – SEVERITY (S)
Impact on patient

Impact on clinical staff

Catastrophic (4)

Injury resulting in escalation in level of care,
surgical procedure, permanent disability, or
death

Injury resulting in permanent loss of
function, requiring hospitalization,
permanent or prolonged loss of ability to
perform current duties

Major (3)

Non-life threatening delay in care or injury
Injury requiring medical attention,
requiring medical attention without escalation
resulting in temporary loss of function or
in level of care, surgical procedure, permanent missed work time
disability, or death

Moderate (2)

Significant negative impact on patient/family
experience; varies from stated goals for
patient/family experience

Reliability a source of work-related
stress and anxiety for staff, introduces
inefficiency that impacts frequently
performed tasks, otherwise seen as
negatively affecting wellness

Minor (1)

No significant negative impact on patient/
family experience

Minor nuisance that is not a significant
source of stress or anxiety for the
majority of staff who encounter the
problem

Failure would cause
death or injury

Failure causes high
degree of dissatisfaction

Failure overcome with
process improvement,
minor performance loss
exists

Failure not noticeable
to patient and would
not affect delivery of the
service

HAZARD SCORES (S x P)
Severity (S)

Probability (P)

Frequent (4)

Catastrophic (4)

Major (3)

Moderate
Minor (1)
(2)

16

12

8

4

Occasional (3)

12

9

6

3

Uncommon (2)

8

6

4

2

Remote (1)

4

3

2

1

Figure 3. Key for HFMEA Assignment of Severity, Probability, and Hazard Scores. HFMEA aims to identify
failure modes and help prioritize resources to address those failure modes by calculating a hazard score.
Hazard scores are calculated by multiplying the probability (P) of an event happening with its expected severity
(S), both of which are scored on a 4-point scale. The criteria for assigning these scores are detailed in the
figure. In an HFMEA, any failure mode with a hazard score greater than 8 should receive immediate attention
and mitigation.

https://knowledgeconnection.mainehealth.org/jmmc/vol3/iss2/8
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Table 1. Stakeholders Who Assembled for
Healthcare Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Stakeholder
Anesthesiology (physician and CRNA*)
OR circulating RN
COVID-19 floor unit RN
Respiratory therapy
OR patient transport services
Central patient transport services
Volunteer services (oversees transport services)
Special infectious disease team
Operative and perioperative quality and safety
Simulation center leadership
Abbreviations: CRNA, certified registered nurse anesthetist;
OR, operating room; RN, registered nurse

The next phases of hazard analysis used simulation
to accomplish 2 objectives, identified based on
results from the table-top simulation. The first
aimed to establish the optimal path of travel while
minimizing the time spent outside of a negativepressure room and the potential for environmental
or personnel contamination. The second aimed to
test the transport protocol under stress.
Optimizing the path of travel.
Table-top simulation revealed that several possible
routes may be used to transport patients from
a COVID-19 unit to the OR. Route selection
was determined based on the preferences of
the transport team. Recognizing that each route
presents variable risk according to hallway traffic,
elevator size, and time spent in transit, the goal
of this exercise was to evaluate each route and
determine whether one presented less overall risk
than another. Four members of the team (3 in their
usual roles [anesthesia provider, OR transport,
patient transport] and a simulation team member
collecting data) pushed an empty stretcher and
intravenous pole from the COVID-19 unit to the
OR along each potential path of travel. During
each run, the data collector documented possible
bystander exposure by measuring the number of
open doors passed (both patient rooms and offices),
and the number of nurse’s stations and individuals
encountered. Another team member tracked the
transport time from the negative-pressure room to
the threshold of the OR area.
Published by MaineHealth Knowledge Connection, 2021

Protocol testing with stresses.
The second phase simulated transport per
institutional protocol to and from the OR, and
included a mildly agitated patient (played by JK)
to simulate a high-probability, high-severity FM
identified during the table-top exercise. This phase
involved 2 scenarios.
The first scenario began in the patient room with
a nurse educator from the COVID-19 unit who
assumed the role of the bedside nurse in hospitalrecommended PPE (N95 respirator, face shield,
gown, gloves, and shoe covers). The nurse
educator prepared the patient for transport. An OR
nurse and OR transport team member collected the
patient using the equipment, protocols, and PPE
recommended at the time (hospital scrubs, surgical
mask, contact precaution gown, and gloves).
To simulate a mildly uncooperative patient, JK
portrayed a well-meaning person who occasionally
removed his surgical mask while talking or coughing.
The second scenario portrayed transport back from
the OR with the personnel who would transport
an uncomplicated, non-intubated patient with
COVID-19 (OR nurse, OR transport, and certified
registered nurse anesthetist). For the return trip,
JK simulated a state of mild agitation resulting
from anesthesia emergence: non-adherent to
instructions to not touch surfaces or remove their
surgical mask and inadvertently knocked sheets/
pillows out of the stretcher while changing position.
Stakeholders shadowed the transport team to
observe the process from start to finish and captured
video for subsequent review.
Following the simulations, the team debriefed to
generate a list of FMs and mitigation strategies,
and to consider participant perception of personal
safety from infection transmission. The team
then assigned severity and probability ratings to
calculate hazard scores.
By consensus, changes to the transport protocol
were proposed and reviewed by all team members
and forwarded to the OR and anesthesia senior
leadership for review and approval.
5
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RESULTS
In the HFMEA framework (Figure 1), our results
include findings from the hazard analysis as well
as mitigation strategies identified in the fifth step
“Actions and Outcome Measures.” In the process
of our hazard analysis, we identified FMs from 3
phases of testing: (1) theoretically exploring the
process (table-top simulation), (2) optimizing the
path of travel, and (3) stressing the protocols in
place to evaluate their resilience.
1. Table-top simulation
The 3 major FMs, all with critical hazard scores,
identified from the table-top simulation included: (1)
path of travel was at the discretion of healthcare staff
and could result in unnecessary exposure, (2) even
mildly agitated or uncooperative patients increase

the risks of environmental and staff exposure to
infection, and (3) standard recommendations for
PPE may not be sufficient for staff while transporting
patients.
2. Paths of travel
Table 2 displays results from path-of-travel testing.
Several factors proved important to consider for
safety. Path 3 offered a larger elevator space,
which minimized close contact, but the route was
more heavily trafficked, with 2 times the incidental
contacts of either alternative route. The other routes
resulted in roughly equivalent incidental exposures,
but Path 1 had a significantly smaller elevator
space. Considering all factors, incidental contacts,
elevator size, and time, Path 2 was recommended
for usual path of travel.

Table 2. Results of Path-of-Travel Testing
Path 1

Path 2

Path 3

3:33

2:45

3:58

Hospital visitor

1

0

0

Open door – patient room

0

0

5

Staff member

6

4

8

Open door – office or workroom

2

4

3

Nursing station

1

0

1

Total incidental contacts

8 + desk

8

16 + desk

Notes

Smallest elevator,
obvious path to
radiology suites

Transport person could
request doors to close Largest elevator
ahead of patient

Total time in transport, min:sec
Incidental contacts during transport

https://knowledgeconnection.mainehealth.org/jmmc/vol3/iss2/8
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3. Simulation-enhanced transport with mildly
agitated patient
Table 3 shows FMs, hazard scores, and mitigation
strategies identified with simulation-based transport
testing.
In this exercise, 13 LSTs were noted, of which 10
had critical hazard scores. Four of these LSTs were
in the category of infection prevention, including the
item with highest hazard score (12). This item noted
that transport staff at the head of the bed could not
maintain a 6-foot distance in an elevator or if a patient
required assistance. To mitigate this risk, the team
proposed a multi-faceted approach. To minimize
close-proximity exposure, the group recommended
a path of travel that avoided the smallest elevator.
To better contain exposure at the source, the group
recommended that nurses in sending units remind
the patient of the importance of keeping their mask
on at all times. Finally, to bolster personal protection,
the group recommended transport staff by the head
of the bed use a higher level of PPE.
Incidental exposure due to unexpected patient
behavior (eg, coughing in an elevator, touching
a rail or wall, dropping a sheet or pillow) resulted
in at least 4 LSTs, all with critical hazard scores.
Mitigation solutions proposed to address these
LSTs included bringing a supply of germicidal wipes
along on transport and adding one transport staff
that could stay behind to ensure decontamination
without delaying transport. They also recommended
a higher level of PPE for transport staff by the head
of the patient to enable them to provide safe and
immediate assistance to the patient when needed.
4. Actions and outcome measures
After presenting results to surgical services
leadership, recommendations were forwarded to
hospital senior leadership, including those involved
with infection prevention. Based on the evolving
international understanding of best practices and
our findings, the hospital transport policy was
revised (Appendix 1). Notable changes based on
the simulation-enhanced HFMEA testing included:
(1) changing PPE for the clinician expected to
provide direct patient care, (2) changing PPE for the
second and/or third transport providers given the
challenge of 6-foot distancing in some elevators,
(3) carefully considering a need for larger transport

Published by MaineHealth Knowledge Connection, 2021

teams if the patient may require direct care, and
(4) no longer involving patient transport services
in transporting patients with COVID-19, unless the
staff were serving as a “runner” ahead of the team
to clear hallways or push elevator buttons.

DISCUSSION
Used together, HFMEA and in situ simulation
were an effective means to prospectively detect
LSTs in our protocol for transporting patients with
COVID-19. With support from our surgical services
and hospital leadership, our interprofessional
team rapidly assembled key stakeholders who
used table-top simulation guided by HFMEA and
in-depth hazard analysis using in situ simulation
to discover, explore, and mitigate these LSTs.
Because these findings involved physical paths of
travel with concerns about time, contact, and unsafe
patient behaviors, simulation was an ideal tool to
explore these LSTs. Using data derived from our
simulations, we identified the optimal path of travel
from among 3 routes that had previously been used,
and illustrated the risks to the patient and staff when
using the institutional best practices in place at the
time. Our recommendations contributed to changes
in the number and roles of personnel involved in
transporting patients with COVID-19, as well as the
PPE staff use. The broad applicability of our effort
is supported by the fact that our findings were used
to modify not only OR transport protocols, but also
protocols used for the entire hospital.
Simulation is well-recognized as a useful safety
tool to recreate real-world experience to explore
and improve complex systems in healthcare.16,17,18
In our study, the accurate simulation of transporting
a patient exhibiting credible behavioral variability
was an ideal modality to evaluate safety threats in
our process. Watching the transport nurse hesitate
to assist the patient due to concern for exposure to
infection, as well as the nurse’s reported sense of
vulnerability during debriefing, highlighted the need
for enhanced PPE for at least one member of the
transport team. HFMEA provides a useful framework
to approach a process; identify, categorize, and
quantify risk in the FMs; and propose solutions
by engaging and involving all stakeholders in the
process.2 Together, HFMEA and simulation can
generate a more thorough analysis than simulation
alone.3

7
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Table 3. Results of HFMEA and Simulation Testing
Step in the
process map

HFMEA
category

Potential
failure mode

Failure effects

Path of travel does not
minimize exposure risk

Unnecessary
exposure of
bystander staff/
patients along path of
travel

Route determined
by preference of
transport team
Care
coordination

Nurse from
COVID-19 unit
prepares patient
for transport

Facilities

Transport staff unable
to maintain a 6-foot
distance*

Increased risk to staff
in elevators when
assisting patient who
removed their mask

Care
coordination

Bystander traffic
unaware of a patient
with COVID-19
traveling through
pathway

Bystander traffic not
prepared to institute
safety measures
to minimize risk of
exposure

Clinical skill

Transport staff
inconsistently
communicates with
patient about keeping
their mask on during
transport

https://knowledgeconnection.mainehealth.org/jmmc/vol3/iss2/8
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Patient does not
maintain mask over
face and increases
exposure to transport
staff

Severity
(S)

3

3

2

3

Probability
Hazard
Action plan
(P)
score (SxP)

3

3

3

3

9

Identified optimal path
of travel to ICU and
patient floors

9

Transport guideline
changed to ensure
proper PPE for
transport staff; verbal
engagement with
patient before physical
assistance with mask

6

Transport staff will
communicate that a
patient with COVID-19
is traveling through
pathway; staff along
pathway close office
doors

9

Educate staff on
importance of a pretransport brief with
patient to discuss
keeping mask on and
coughing under sheet
to decrease potential
contamination
8
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Table 3 (cont). Results of HFMEA and Simulation Testing
Step in the
process map
CRNA +
circulator RN
transport
non-intubated
patient back to
COVID-19 unit

HFMEA
category

Potential
failure mode

Failure effects

Care
coordination

Insufficient number
of transport staff to
manage agitated
patient*

Agitated patient
removes surgical
mask and
contaminates staff
and environment

Diagnosis and
treatment

Transport staff
unable to safely
transport patient while
maintaining a 6-foot
distance

Increased risk to staff
in elevators when
assisting patient with
surgical mask

Facilities

Extraneous hallway
equipment along path
of travel

Transport difficulty
increased

Equipment and
devices

Insufficient monitoring
equipment during
transport

Delayed recognition
and treatment
of patient
decompensation

Equipment and
devices

Excessive transport
equipment

Transport difficulty
increased

Infection
prevention

Transport staff at
head of bed not able
to maintain 6-foot
distance due to small
elevators*

Increased risk to staff
at head of bed

Published by MaineHealth Knowledge Connection, 2021

Severity
(S)

3

3

3

3

3

3

Probability
Hazard
Action plan
(P)
score (SxP)

3

3

2

3

2

4

9

Guideline changed to
increase the number
of transport team
members to 3

9

Guideline changed to
ensure proper PPE for
transport staff; educate
staff about verbal
engagement with
patient before physical
assistance with mask

6

Communicate with staff
on units to remove
extraneous equipment
before patient transport

9

Transport patient with
portable pulse oximeter
at a minimum due to
the potential of rapid
decompensation

6

Minimize necessary
equipment (eg, remove
maintenance IV); place
equipment on stretcher
(eg, IV pumps)

12

Educate staff at head of
bed to wear N95 mask,
eye protection, and
gown
9
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Table 3 (cont). Results of HFMEA and Simulation Testing
Step in the
process map
CRNA +
circulator RN
transport
non-intubated
patient back to
COVID-19 unit

HFMEA
category

Potential
failure mode

Infection
prevention

Patient contaminates
surfaces that may be
touched by transport
or bystander staff

Increased risk
to transport and
bystander staff

Infection
prevention

Patient coughs in
elevator

Dwell time of virus
increases risk to
elevator traffic after
transport

Failure effects

Care coordination

Agitated patient
contaminates side
rails, linen, pillow

Increased risk to
transport staff posttransport

Infection
prevention

Insufficient dry
time after transport
surfaces are
decontaminated

Increased risk
to transport and
bystander staff

Severity
(S)

3

3

3

4

Probability
(P)

3

3

3

1

Hazard
score
(SxP)

Action plan

9

Assign transport
staff to monitor
and immediately
decontaminate surfaces
with portable germicidal
wipes

9

Discussed identified
risk with infection
prevention and
environmental services

9

Enhance PPE
recommendations for
transport staff; bring
portable germicidal
wipes and assign
transport staff to
post-transport
decontamination

4

Educate transport
team on sufficient
dry time after surface
decontamination

Abbreviations: CRNA, certified registered nurse anesthetist; HFMEA, Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis; ICU, intensive care unit; IV, intravenous; PPE,
personal protective equipment; RN, registered nurse.
*Failure modes identified only during in situ simulations.

https://knowledgeconnection.mainehealth.org/jmmc/vol3/iss2/8
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In the year after SARS-CoV-2 arrived, multiple
reports have described how simulation can help
to rapidly evolve healthcare processes driven by a
novel threat to society.20,21,22 OR protocols are just
one high-stakes area in which COVID-19 markedly
changed usual practices. Lie et al described a
similar but larger-scale endeavor to use in situ
simulation to improve OR preparedness in their
Singapore hospital. Their study, though broader
in scope, identified the transport process as the
first major LST detected.23 Patient transport is a
high-risk event, as it often results from a change in
patient condition and invariably involves a hand-off
between teams of providers. Just before COVID-19
was officially labeled a pandemic, a group from
Singapore identified patient transport as a high-risk
event for nosocomial spread. They wrote a letter
to the journal Critical Care that proposed 5 areas
of safety concern to help guide other hospital’s
policies for transporting patients with COVID-19.24
They identified patient safety, safety of healthcare
workers and transport staff, bystander safety,
rescue and contingency plans during transport, and
post-transport decontamination as areas of risk.
Each of these areas was reflected in FMs identified
in our study (Table 3). These recommendations
were based on their own early experience, and
they hoped that by sharing their retrospective
experience, other hospitals could learn and avoid
harm to patients or staff. Our approach, using
HFMEA and in situ simulation, enabled prospective
experience that enhanced safety at our institution.
Eight months into the COVID-19 pandemic, Van
Zundert and colleagues called for the review of
airway and patient management workflows using
proven patient safety tools, such as HFMEA
and simulation.25 They cited the incomplete
understanding of the risks of SARS-CoV-2
transmission and uncertainty around PPE and
best clinical practices to reduce infection risk, as
ongoing threats to the physical and emotional
safety of healthcare workers. Levy and colleagues
combined HFMEA with in situ simulation in an
iterative fashion to safety test a field hospital
before caring for patients.26 A group in Latvia
used simulation and HFMEA to decrease risk of
SARS-CoV-2 transmission in their emergency
department. In their study, 2 major areas of LSTs
included PPE and the need to establish or revise
protocols.27 In our testing, our team found that
PPE recommended for personnel transporting
the patient was likely insufficient to protect staff in
the event of even minimal changes in a patient’s
Published by MaineHealth Knowledge Connection, 2021

condition. By revising policies to include equipment
that protects individuals at the head of the bed from
airborne infection, at minimum, staff could respond
to the patient’s needs and still maintain personal
protection. This change has become even more
relevant with our evolving understanding of the
predominantly airborne risk of infection.10,11,12
Our table-top exercise revealed that patient
transport personnel were likely inadvertently put in
positions of previously unanticipated risk of infection.
In theory, patient transport personnel do not have
direct patient care responsibility or patient contact,
and thus they use standard precautions to prevent
infection. By including transport personnel as
stakeholders in our hazard analysis, we discovered
that, in practice, personnel may not be able to
avoid direct patient contact if the patient requires
basic assistance. Also, personnel might be near a
patient for previously unanticipated lengths of time
(eg, waiting for a ride to arrive when discharged).
Following our exercise, hospital leadership revised
policies to ensure transport personnel were not
involved in transporting patients with COVID-19,
unless they were used as a front runner without
being near the patient.
Limitations
This project was time-sensitive in addressing an
immediate need to prevent infection during a global
pandemic. As such, we could not conduct iterative
rounds of simulation to test all identified mitigation
strategies. Re-testing with relevant stakeholders
ensures that the proposed mitigation strategies
are practical and achievable. Although we found
that post-transport decontamination or emergent
decontamination after inadvertent exposure
during transport was an important LST, we omitted
an important stakeholder from our exercise:
environmental services.This omission resulted in an
incomplete analysis of the threats of infection and
lingering action items, highlighting the importance of
involving all stakeholders to completely understand,
analyze, and diminish safety concerns.
This work was rooted in a local context, probing our
center’s protocol and using available resources.
In situ simulation is resource intensive. To plan
and execute this exercise required support from
leadership at the highest levels, the time of multiple
stakeholders across several disciplines, and a
simulation center capable of in situ simulation with
expertise in HFMEA. These resources may not
always be readily available.
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CONCLUSIONS
The COVID-19 pandemic required rapid changes to
multiple healthcare protocols to minimize infectious
risk to patients and staff. This need presented a
unique opportunity to demonstrate the power of
HFMEA combined with simulation to rapidly provide
actionable, practical solutions to problems, both
anticipated and unforeseen. Using these methods,
we prospectively identified multiple FMs in existing
OR transport protocols, quickly proposed solutions,
and partnered with hospital leaders to optimize
safety.
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